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Evolving Viruses and  
Stagnant Public Health Policies: 
Flu, Fear, and Free Riders
by Edward P. Richards III
In the winter of 1918–1919, a flu epidemic swept through the 
world, killing tens of millions of people. More than 600,000 
died in the United States, out of a population of about 100 mil-
lion. From 2 percent to 20 percent of infected persons died, 
with many families losing more than one member. While 
many of these persons might have lived with modern medical 
care, the greatest fear of flu experts is that we will again see 
an epidemic of 1918–1919 proportions. The same epidemic in 
the contemporary United States would kill more than 1 mil-
lion people even with modern care. It would completely over-
whelm the health care system for months, which would raise 
the death rate from all other causes as well.
These fears drove the concern with the emergence in the 
spring of 2009 of H1N1 (swine flu), which is virologically 
similar to the 1919 strain of flu. Flu can spread quickly, more 
quickly than vaccines can be developed and rolled out. The 
death rate initially reported for H1N1 was high, compared 
with the usual seasonal flu. From a public health perspec-
tive, the specter of a new flu without an available vaccine and 
with a high death rate is a national emergency. From a politi-
cal perspective, mismanaging such a deadly epidemic would 
make the Hurricane Katrina response controversy pale by 
comparison.
The 2009 H1N1 vaccination campaign was not successful, 
but we were saved—once again—by the virus turning out to 
be much less dangerous than early fears had indicated. 
An article on the reasons this campaign essentially failed, 
what it says about United States vaccine policy, and what we 
need to do to address these problems would usually be pub-
lished in a public health policy journal. So, why an article 
in Litigation? First, while we dodged the bullet this time, 
we have not evolved in any fashion that will make us better 
prepared next time. Second, lawyers are employers and face 
the same issues on workplace vaccine policy as other employ-
ers. Third, lawyers are often called upon for advice by clients 
who are employers. The last, and perhaps most important, rea-
son is that lawyers are responsible for a lot of the problems in 
vaccine compliance and policy. 
What should flu vaccine policy be? It is useful to start with 
how we should manage the flu and then look at the historical 
and legal reasons why we don’t do what we should. First, some 
nomenclature: An epidemic is an excess of cases of a disease 
over those expected in the community. If a community has 100 
cases of syphilis a month, that is the background rate. If this 
increases to 190 cases one month, those 90 extra cases are an 
epidemic of syphilis. “Epidemic” is not a synonym for lots of 
cases, though the media treats it that way. A pandemic is a wide-
spread epidemic—in the most extreme case, a worldwide epi-
demic. “Pandemic” does not mean a world-destroying plague.
Nomenclature matters for flu. With all of the worries about 
a possible swine flu or avian flu pandemic, we forget that we 
have a flu pandemic every fall. Tens of millions of people are 
infected, and there are 15,000–30,000 premature deaths. Bil-
lions of dollars are spent on health care costs and lost produc-
tivity. Small businesses can be shut down if key employees 
are too sick to come to work. The difference between the 
acceptable death rate of a seasonal flu pandemic and a killer 
pandemic is no more than a shift in lethality. A bad seasonal 
flu kills 1 in 1,000, and usually among the old or infirm. A 
deadly, society-disrupting flu kills 1 in 100, including more 
young people. 
There are three defenses to the flu: flu vaccine, personal 
hygiene, and social engineering. Ideally, we would rapidly 
immunize 90 percent of the population. This would make 
everything else less important. Personal hygiene includes 
hand washing, no shaking hands or social kissing, and other 
strategies to avoid transferring a virus from your hands to your 
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eyes and mouth. Social engineering means keeping infected 
persons away from uninfected persons. Employers should 
discourage people who are infected with the flu from com-
ing to work. Schools and other institutions should discourage 
infected persons from coming into contact with other persons. 
This becomes less of a problem with high immunization rates 
because fewer people will be sick. 
Health care institutions pose a special problem. Histori-
cally, they have been major sources of infection in commu-
nicable disease outbreaks. They are places full of people 
weakened by other illnesses and people with the commu-
nicable disease. Ironically, most health care institutions do 
not require staff to be immunized against the flu, and some 
require no immunizations at all for staff. Health care provid-
ers should be immunized against the flu (and other communi-
cable diseases) to prevent the spread of disease to patients and 
other staff. Health care institutions should also be required to 
screen patients seeking care for flu symptoms as they enter the 
facility and separate them from other patients in the waiting 
room. Everyone who has spent time in a crowded emergency 
department waiting room is aware of the problem of shar-
ing the room with coughing and sneezing patients. Further, 
responders such as police, fire, and EMS personnel should be 
immunized and should use personal protection such as gloves 
and masks when dealing with potentially infected persons.
All pretty simple and cheap. Getting there is the hard part. 
Employers and schools and every social institution would 
have to require their employees, students, and wards to be 
immunized. Employers and others would also have to have 
strict workplace policies discouraging people from coming 
to work sick. This would require sick pay, changes in union 
contracts, and a philosophical change from the “work till you 
drop” ethos in the workplace. How do lawyers reconcile 2,200 
billable hours with staying home when sick? (This is not so 
hard with online access to Westlaw and LEXIS, but how do 
police officers or nurses work from home?)
We should do this, or as much as possible, starting with 
immunizations, because it would save lives, suffering, and 
money every year. We are a health- and risk-obsessed society. 
We make major changes in public policy over health risks that 
affect relative handfuls of people, while effectively ignoring 
seasonal flu. The most important reason we should do this, 
however, is that we need to be ready in case we do get a killer 
flu or other communicable disease emergency. 
You cannot change ingrained behaviors and beliefs over-
night. You cannot overrule anti-vaccination policies in union 
contracts, make workers stay home when they are part of a 
workforce that has been socialized to come to work if they 
can still crawl, or get police to wear masks and gloves by just 
saying, gee, this is a bad flu, we need to do everything differ-
ently. Once bodies start piling up in the streets, behavior will 
change, but by then you have likely lost the opportunity to 
control the outbreak.
The federal government needs to fund standby vaccine 
production capacity to allow the quick manufacture and test-
ing of vaccines for new viruses. Our current vaccine procure-
ment system is broken, lurching between vaccine shortages 
some years and excess vaccine being destroyed other years. 
As H1N1 demonstrated, we cannot reliably produce vaccine 
on a tight schedule. Congress needs to address liability for 
workplace immunization programs and for sick-time policies 
for persons who are able to work but who are being asked to 
stay at home to protect others. Confusion over state laws and 
worker’s compensation insurance provisions should not be 
allowed to derail effective national vaccine policy.
State and local health departments need to rebuild their 
disease-control infrastructure. During the past 20 years, state 
and local governments have cut health department disease 
control budgets, and federal funding has shifted from basic 
public health to terrorism and disaster-of-the-day issues. This 
has forced most health departments to fire or not replace epide-
miologists and the other disease-control staff who are needed 
to track and manage epidemics. These losses do not just affect 
the flu; they undermine control of human immunodeficiency 
virus (HIV) and even bioterrorism response. Having an elabo-
rate plan and a pile of emergency laws is cheaper than having 
staff, but it is not a substitute for trained staff when you have 
an outbreak—or a hurricane or an oil spill.
These are not radical or even very costly ideas. Some of 
them are just getting us back to where we were 40 years ago. 
Adopting this approach, especially mandatory immuniza-
tions, however, is politically impossible at this point in time. 
Understanding why, and the pivotal role played by lawyers in 
creating this problem, requires a brief review of communi-
cable disease control and politics.
Smallpox: A Case Study in the Value of 
Vaccinations 
For much of the history of humankind, life was nasty, brut-
ish, and short. Even in relatively modern times, life was short. 
In 1849, Lemuel Shattuck found that the average life expec-
tancy in Boston was 25 years. It was somewhat higher in the 
rural areas, but even there, it was less than 35 years. Over 
the next 160 years, life expectancy in the United States has 
increased to nearly 80 years. A significant part of this increase 
is due to vaccines and mandatory disease-control programs.
Smallpox is the paradigmatic vaccine-preventable dis-
ease. It evolved with humans and infects no other animals. 
It is a disease of civilization in that it requires enough den-
sity of population that it can keep finding new victims—if at 
any point no one is infected, then the disease would disappear 
because there would be no source of new infection. If you are 
infected with smallpox, you have a 5–30 percent chance of 
dying. If you survive, you will be scarred (pocked) and may 
suffer brain damage or blindness. You also get lifetime immu-
nity to a second smallpox infection.
Smallpox in a naïve community—one that had not had an 
epidemic during the lifetime of the inhabitants—would kill 
both by direct infection and by disrupting society. If parents 
were too sick to care for their children, the children might 
die even if they survived the disease. Visit an old graveyard 
in a community that had a smallpox epidemic, and you see 
clusters of tombstones with the same death dates, sometimes 
whole families wiped out. If a significant part of the popula-
tion was infected, social order itself could break down. The 
early United States Supreme Court opinions that discussed 
epidemics saw them as national security threats, not just 
health threats, thus justifying broad and intrusive powers to 
control them.
In communities with recurrent epidemics of smallpox, the 
primary victims have been the children born since the last epi-
demic. While less destructive to social order, losing children 
has both emotional and economic consequences in communi-
ties that need all available labor for subsistence. This is the 
common pattern for communicable diseases that create immu-
nity in those who survive: They become childhood illnesses. 
They still take a toll on adults who are not infected as children, 
but the majority of their victims are children. 
In 1798, Edward Jenner published his work, An Inquiry 
into the Causes and Effects of the Variolae Vaccinae, on 
vaccinating against smallpox using a related virus, cowpox, 
which caused little illness but which created immunity against 
smallpox. The British government, concerned by the toll 
smallpox took on the population in general and on military 
recruits in particular, pushed for widespread smallpox vac-
cinations. Smallpox vaccination was rapidly adopted by other 
countries, including the United States. 
Mandatory smallpox vaccinations brought the disease 
under control in developed countries by World War II. The 
development of a stable vaccine that could be used without 
refrigeration allowed massive smallpox control programs in 
the developing world. The year 1947 saw the last smallpox 
cases in the United States. There were no more cases world-
wide by the mid-1980s. Smallpox was eradicated in nature—
the first disease to be eradicated. A worldwide, mandatory 
smallpox vaccination and control program ended one of the 
great scourges of man.
The Legal Basis for Mandatory Vaccinations 
Ironically, today the public’s support for vaccinations is at a 
low point, even though vaccines are extremely safe, safer than 
they have ever been in the past. In contrast, smallpox vacci-
nation during the 1800s and early 1900s was a risky proposi-
tion. The vaccine was often contaminated by disease-causing 
bacteria and viruses, and cowpox itself could produce a dan-
gerous illness in persons whose immune systems had been 
weakened by cancer and other diseases. Many people, includ-
ing clergy, resisted vaccination. 
In 1905, the United States Supreme Court decided Jacob-
son v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), its only decision 
directly dealing with the right of the state to require vaccina-
tion of all citizens. At the time of Jacobson, Massachusetts 
had authorized the health department to require smallpox vac-
cinations when the health department determined that there 
was a threat of smallpox in the community (making this a 
classic administrative law decision). There was a criminal 
fine for refusing vaccination. Jacobson was a clergyman who 
was opposed to smallpox vaccination because of the risks of 
complications. These were not irrational objections and were 
supported by scientific evidence. For those who may have for-
gotten Constitutional Law I, this is the same Court, during 
the same term, that decided Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 
45 (1905). Lochner held that the state did not have the right 
to trump the liberty of bakers to contract away their health 
and safety. Thus, we have a Court that was not noted for its 
sweeping deference to state legislatures, even on health and 
safety matters.
Nonetheless, the Jacobson Court endorsed the legislature’s 
power to require smallpox vaccinations. In the strongest lan-
guage, it reiterated that the social contract runs in both direc-
tions: Individuals have rights in society, but they also have 
duties to society. Individuals cannot enjoy the benefits of the 
social contract without bearing its burdens, which include 
enduring the risks of vaccination. Subsequent decisions make 
it clear that the state need not provide a religious exception 
to mandatory vaccination laws, only that it not discriminate 
among religions if it does grant an exemption.
Jacobson rests on three legs. In modern terms, it is a state 
police power case. The state police power has better origi-
nal intent support than most constitutional powers. Yellow 
fever ravaged the colonies, killing 10 percent of the popula-
tion of Philadelphia in one summer. Starting in the colonial 
period and through the drafting of the Constitution, the states 
imposed individual quarantines and other disease-control 
measures. The public health powers were clearly part of the 
powers retained by the states. Jacobson is also supported by 
the older concept of mayhem—as defined by Blackstone, the 
prohibition of self-maiming to avoid military service. May-
hem laws reflected the right of the state to protect its citizens 
for the services they provide the state. 
The oldest authority for Jacobson, and other public health 
powers related to epidemics, is societal self-defense. Soci-
etal self-defense is the fundamental right of states to do what 
is necessary for their self-preservation. It is also the root of 
national security law and the reason that public health power, 
as applied to epidemic disease, should be seen as a national 
security power and not just as a state police power. Under this 
theory, whether you can keep trans-fat out of bagels is clearly a 
police power question, and whether you can require individu-
als to be vaccinated against a disease that could destroy social 
order in the United States is a national security law question.
The Jacobson decision is more than 100 years old, but it is 
still good law. Civil libertarian scholars, and even some law-
yers within the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC), have argued that the Warren Court implicitly limited 
Jacobson. A careful reading of the Supreme Court’s deci-
sions during the past 40 years shows instead that the Court 
has used public health law language as the basis for preventive 
detention in criminal law and as the rationale for many of the 
national security law cases that allow massive intrusions into 
individual liberties to protect the public. It is unlikely that this 
Supreme Court, or any politically conceivable future Court, 
will find that the state is powerless to require individuals to 
be vaccinated against diseases that threaten the public health 
and safety.
The Epidemiology of Jacobson 
Jacobson is good epidemiology as well as good law. In the 
simplest case, a vaccination protects the vaccinee from a dis-
ease, and it does not matter if anyone else gets vaccinated. 
The only required vaccine like this is for tetanus. Tetanus is a 
serious and often fatal poisoning caused by a bacterium that 
is ubiquitous in the environment. Tetanus is not spread from 
person to person; it is caught from the environment, usually 
The early Supreme Court 
opinions that discussed 
epidemics saw them as 
national security threats.
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related to an injury such as stepping on a nail. If you are not 
vaccinated against tetanus, it only affects your risk of having 
the disease; it does not affect anyone else. The community’s 
resistance to tetanus is just the sum of each individual’s immu-
nity to tetanus.
Vaccines that protect against diseases that are spread from 
person to person depend on herd immunity, not solely on indi-
vidual immunity. This means that the individual’s risk of being 
infected and perhaps dying from the disease depends both 
on the individual’s vaccination status and the proportion of 
the community that has been vaccinated. For example, many 
vaccines provide incomplete protection against the disease. 
Flu vaccine reduces the chance of an individual becoming 
infected, and reduces the severity of the disease if the indi-
vidual is infected. Some people cannot be successfully vacci-
nated because they are allergic to a component of the vaccine 
such as the chicken egg protein in the flu vaccine. Others have 
a weak immune system that cannot produce immunity even 
when they are vaccinated.
To understand how herd immunity protects the community 
from the flu, including persons who have not been vaccinated, 
think of a flu epidemic as a fire. People are the fuel for the fire. 
An unvaccinated person burns hot and long, and spreads the 
fire most effectively. A vaccinated person may not catch fire 
at all, and will burn weakly, spreading the fire to few people. 
If everyone in the community who can be successfully vac-
cinated is vaccinated, say 95 percent of the at-risk popula-
tion, then the virus will find little fuel and will spread slowly 
and to relatively few people. It will likely die out before there 
is a major epidemic. Everyone’s chance of catching the flu is 
reduced dramatically, and people who cannot be vaccinated 
because of their medical condition are still protected.
As the percentage of vaccinated persons falls, the epidemic 
finds more fuel. Persons who have not been vaccinated become 
sick, sicker than if they had been vaccinated. Persons who 
were vaccinated are at greater risk of being infected because 
the virus spreads more widely in the community, carried by 
the infected unvaccinated. Persons who could not be vacci-
nated are at higher risk of infection and serious illness. At 
some reduced level of community vaccination, herd immunity 
breaks down and the disease spreads throughout the commu-
nity, rather than dying out. This point varies with the nature 
of the disease. One important factor is how easy the disease 
spreads, known as its “communicability.” The more commu-
nicable the disease, the higher the percentage of the popula-
tion that must be vaccinated for herd immunity to be effective. 
Extremely contagious diseases such as measles require very 
high vaccination rates. Diseases that leave persons infectious 
for long periods of time also require higher herd immunity 
rates.
Thus the free-rider problem: Herd immunity can protect 
an individual who has not been vaccinated, as long as almost 
everyone else has been vaccinated. But herd immunity fails, 
injuring everyone, if too many people become free riders. In 
any given year, more than half the population does not get 
adequately vaccinated, undermining any herd immunity 
effect. This is also a global issue—severe acute respiratory 
syndrome (SARS) crossed the ocean in a matter of days. Our 
risk is increased by vaccination policy in other countries.
While herd immunity was not clearly understood when 
Jacobson was decided, everyone understood that communities 
in which many people were vaccinated had fewer problems 
with epidemics. When a vaccine really is dangerous, as the 
smallpox vaccine was in 1905, it is understandable that peo-
ple would want to opt out and hope their vaccinated neigh-
bors would protect them or their children. The Jacobson Court 
understood that if persons could opt out of vaccination, just as 
if they could opt out of the draft, the community and the nation 
would be put at risk, not just the individuals who opted out.
When did the vaccination system go wrong? Smallpox vac-
cinations were required in the United States through the early 
1970s. Smallpox vaccine at that time was pure, so there was 
no more problem with contamination by dangerous bacteria or 
viruses. However, the vaccine was a live virus vaccine, so the 
person being vaccinated had a mild case of what was thought 
to be cowpox, and that gave the immunity to smallpox. (When 
genetic analysis technology became available, it was found that 
the virus in smallpox vaccine was probably not cowpox but a 
version of another animal pox that is extinct in the wild.) For 
persons with immune system diseases, the smallpox vaccine 
can cause life-threatening illness. While immunosuppressive 
diseases were relatively rare in the early 1970s, about one per-
son per million vaccinated died, and many more became ill. 
The public generally accepted this risk and supported man-
datory vaccination laws. Vaccines for diphtheria, pertussis 
(whooping cough), and tetanus had been required for years. 
These vaccines were all much safer than smallpox vaccine, 
but they did have occasional side effects. Polio vaccine had 
been introduced in the mid-1950s. A batch of polio vaccine 
made by Cutter Labs in 1958 was improperly processed and 
caused more than 100 cases of polio. This was before products 
liability law or large tort judgments. Some compensation was 
paid, but these vaccine injuries were seen as an aberration and 
did not undermine the general confidence in vaccines. A vac-
cine for measles, mumps, and rubella was introduced in 1971.
Change was afoot, however, and a major factor in this 
change came from the American Law Institute. The Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts brought us section 402a and 402b—
products liability—in 1965. This made it much easier to 
sue drug manufacturers, especially vaccine manufacturers 
because the learned intermediary defense is weakened for 
mass immunization programs. Another factor was the suc-
cess in eradicating smallpox. By 1970, it had been more than 
20 years since the last case in the United States, and there 
were only limited cases in developing countries. Because 
the population had a pretty high herd immunity, policymak-
ers decided that the risk of a smallpox outbreak had been so 
reduced that the risk of complications of routine smallpox 
vaccinations was now greater. Routine smallpox immuniza-
tions were discontinued, the first time a vaccine had been 
discontinued because it was now more risky than the disease. 
(There were dissenters who argued that if smallpox vaccina-
tion was discontinued, the world eventually would be at risk 
of a global smallpox epidemic that could destroy whole soci-
eties—which is where we are now, if smallpox were to turn 
up as a bioterrorism weapon.)
The First Swine Flu Immunization Campaign 
The critical event began in February 1976. Routine viral 
analysis among military recruits with the flu found the usual 
seasonal flu strain, but a few samples had a new, previously 
unknown strain. There were several characteristics of the virus 
that made the scientists at the CDC worry that it might resem-
ble the 1918–1919 Spanish influenza. They were characteristics 
of a type of virus shared with pigs, which is where the name 
swine flu comes from. The CDC was really concerned about 
the time frame: A virus picked up as a new strain in the late 
winter was likely to reappear as a major epidemic the next fall. 
If they decided that people needed to be vaccinated against this 
new strain, there was very little time to get started on making 
the vaccine and vaccinating people before the fall flu season.
The small time frame short-circuited the decision making 
on the 1976 swine flu immunization campaign. At all points, 
the CDC was forced to balance the risk of going into a major 
epidemic with no preparation against the risks of an unneeded 
mass vaccination effort. We had been doing seasonal flu 
vaccination campaigns for years without problems, so little 
thought was given to the risks of an unnecessary campaign. 
The decision was made at the White House by President Ford 
to go ahead with a massive rush vaccination campaign.
The first hint of the brave new world coming was when vac-
cine manufacturers refused to make the vaccine unless they 
were indemnified by the government. The vaccine manufac-
turers were beginning to see large products liability verdicts 
for unpreventable and sometimes improbable vaccine injuries. 
They were unwilling to ensure the safety of a new vaccine 
that would be rolled out with little clinical testing. Congress 
agreed to immunize the vaccine manufacturers against any 
legal claims. Congress went further, however, and set up an 
unprecedented vaccine injury compensation fund. Essentially, 
vaccine injury claims would be turned into modified federal 
tort claims, with strict liability claims allowed.
While there was little discussion of it at the time, this com-
pensation fund represented a profound shift in vaccine policy. 
Previously, vaccine injuries, at least those not due to real neg-
ligence, were just part of the cost of living in society. With 
this fund, people were promised that they would be taken 
care of if they suffered an injury from doing their civic duty.
The vaccine was rolled out before the usual flu season. 
Although it was voluntary, there was high participation in 
the program. Soon after the vaccinations began, questions 
were raised about whether the vaccine was linked to cases of 
a rare neurologic disease, Guillain–Barré syndrome. This is 
a progressive neurologic disease that in extreme cases para-
lyzes the body and requires the patient to be put on a ventila-
tor. The extreme cases are easy to diagnose accurately. The 
milder cases are much more ambiguous, and there were no 
definitive diagnostic tests. Once the alert went out, neurolo-
gists who saw a patient with neurologic signs with no clear 
cause, and who had recently been vaccinated for swine flu, 
diagnosed him or her with Guillain–Barré syndrome. This 
was especially true if the doctor was already working closely 
with a plaintiff’s attorney on other injury cases. 
Soon there was a huge Guillain–Barré syndrome scare, 
and the swine flu vaccination campaign was ended. The 
expected swine flu never materialized, profoundly undermin-
ing the credibility of the CDC and of vaccines. The swine 
flu compensation program was flooded with claims and paid 
out much more money than had been anticipated. Years later, 
careful epidemiology on military personnel who had been 
vaccinated, but who were not part of the compensation pro-
gram, showed that there was no real evidence that the vac-
cine caused excess cases of Guillain–Barré syndrome. The 
problem had been that no one had carefully counted the 
background cases of Guillain–Barré syndrome that nor-
mally occurred. Without knowing how many people got 
Guillain–Barré syndrome each year, it made sense to believe 
that the cases were due to the vaccine.
The Aftermath of the Swine Flu Vaccination 
Program 
The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (the 
predecessor to the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices) commissioned a report on the swine flu vaccination 
campaign. It was not flattering, but it did not find that the 
CDC was grossly negligent. The court of public and politi-
cal opinion was less forgiving. The CDC’s internal response 
was to become risk averse, a posture it did not change until 
after 9/11. This meant that it did not strongly advocate for any 
programs that might be controversial, including effective vac-
cination laws. (Unfortunately, reports of a massive hepatitis 
B epidemic in gay bathhouses started coming in just as the 
swine flu campaign was ending. The CDC did not act on these 
and did not recommend shutting the bathhouses. This set the 
stage for the AIDS epidemic, which began in these same bath-
houses in the late 1970s.)
Lawyers learned that vaccine cases could be a gold mine. 
The public had become suspicious about vaccine safety and 
about the government’s vaccine requirements in general. This 
made jurors more friendly to vaccine injury claims, and the 
vaccine injury compensation business was born. A major 
strategy was to undermine the public’s confidence in even 
proven safe vaccines, a strategy that helps to create a fertile 
environment for claims of vaccine injuries without credible 
proof of injury. This is easy to do with vaccinations because 
they are given to millions of children every year. The odds are 
that some of these children are going to have serious medical 
problems with or without vaccines. But convincing a jury that 
the plaintiff’s injury was just part of the background noise 
of life is a hard task unless the judge really pays attention 
to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 
(1993), and excludes weak testimony.
Within 10 years, vaccine litigation was so disruptive that 
Congress created the National Childhood Vaccine Injury 
Act in 1986. This provided statutory compensation for cer-
tain injuries claimed to be due to vaccines, and limited legal 
claims for injuries that were not on the compensation list. This 
act was a political compromise as much as a scientific doc-
ument, and it bolstered the public’s belief that vaccines are 
dangerous. It also fueled attempts to get around the limits on 
litigation by making claims that did not fall under the limits 
of the act. The most damaging of these were the claims that 
vaccines cause autism. 
Autism is a neuropsychiatric condition affecting the rela-
tionship between the affected individual and the environment, 
especially other people. We do not know how it is caused, and 
there are only limited treatments. It has increased dramati-
cally during the past 40 years. Many scientists believe that 
most of this increase is the result of broadening the diagnosis. 
In 1970, the diagnosis of autism was limited to children who 
were so severely affected that they had no contact with other 
people and were not able to function in society at all. Now 
the diagnosis includes much milder conditions. Forty years 
ago, children with these less severe conditions were seen as 
troubled or as having behavioral problems, and were not rec-
ognized as having an illness.
There was never credible medical evidence that vaccines 
cause autism. But vaccines were a natural target—so many 
Published in Litigation, Volume 37, Number 1, Fall 2010. © 2010 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced with permission. All rights reserved. This information  
or any portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent  
of the American Bar Association.
5 
Published in Litigation, Volume 37, Number 1, Fall 2010. © 2010 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced with permission. All rights reserved. This information  
or any portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent  
of the American Bar Association.
6 
children get them that most children with autism had also 
been vaccinated as young children. Autism has become so 
common that it would generate a lot of cases, making it worth 
the effort to solicit and prosecute cases. Because some previ-
ous theories of autism blamed the children’s parents for the 
condition, many autism support groups welcomed a theory 
that exonerated parents and instead pointed to a toxic cause. 
Add the Internet and an uncritical press, and you quickly have 
a national epidemic of autism caused by vaccines. Although 
the last of these cases were dismissed in 2009, they did long-
term damage to people’s willingness to have their children 
vaccinated.
The Changing Political/Legal Environment 
While Jacobson is still good law, it is only permissive: It does 
not require states to protect their citizens with mandatory vacci-
nation laws. When smallpox and other vaccine-preventable dis-
eases were constant threats, and outbreaks were common, the 
public supported public health efforts. This included properly 
funding and staffing disease-control efforts, as well as support-
ing measures such as mandatory vaccines. More important, the 
diseases scared people more than vaccine injuries did. 
A working vaccine program destroys its own political sup-
port. As with smallpox, when the disease disappears from the 
community for long enough that people forget their fears of 
it, they worry more about vaccine injuries than the disease. 
These worries have been exacerbated by vaccine injury liti-
gation and by what have been seen as missteps by the CDC 
in the first swine flu immunization campaign. Unfortunately, 
as political organizations controlled by elected officials, the 
CDC and most public health departments are not in a posi-
tion to provide strong leadership when public sentiment turns 
against an important public health measure.
The political result has been a dramatic weakening of 
mandatory vaccination laws and a failure to pass new vac-
cine requirements. At last count, 23 states had modified their 
mandatory childhood vaccination laws to let parents with any 
objections to vaccinations opt their children out of manda-
tory vaccinations. Because the only enforcement of vaccine 
requirements is to require vaccines before public school 
admission, home-schooled children fall out of the system 
entirely in several states. Even in states without broad opt-out 
provisions, instructions on how to claim a religious exemp-
tion are available over the Internet. Most troublingly, there are 
health care providers who do not believe in vaccinations and 
will provide medical excuses to parents who want to dodge 
childhood vaccine requirements.
More fundamentally, we have almost no mandatory vac-
cination laws for adults. (The only exceptions are for work-
ers in certain high-risk communicable disease laboratory 
jobs.) Adult immunizations are completely voluntary, unless 
required by the employer. There are also no laws helping 
employers who want to require vaccinations. For example, 
hepatitis B is a deadly disease that is spread by contact with 
blood and bodily fluids, as well as by sexual contact. It is a par-
ticular risk for health care workers. The Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA) issued regulations in the 
1980s requiring hospitals to provide the vaccine for workers 
and to encourage the workers to take the vaccine, but OSHA 
did not make vaccination mandatory.
Many hospital employees, even nurses and physicians, 
refuse to be vaccinated for flu and other conditions. Some 
are worried that hastily produced vaccines such as the H1N1 
vaccine have not been adequately tested. This is a legitimate 
concern, but one that we cannot indulge. We cannot promise 
risk-free vaccines, and we cannot let people opt out to let oth-
ers take the risk. But, in return, the government needs to do 
much better at rapidly making and testing vaccines. 
Some just do not believe in vaccination, rejecting even well-
established vaccines such as vaccines against hepatitis A and B. 
Health care worker unions treat this as a collective bargaining 
issue and oppose employer mandates for vaccination. OSHA 
could have required, but did not require, hepatitis B immuniza-
tions in its rulemaking. Congress could provide a safe harbor 
for employers who want to require workplace vaccinations by 
exempting vaccine requirements from collective bargaining 
and other legal challenges. State and local health departments 
could require health care workers to be vaccinated for hepati-
tis B, but they have largely failed to do so because of political 
pressures. New York came under a firestorm of criticism when 
it proposed requiring health care workers to get vaccinated for 
H1N1—despite health care workers being at high risk for both 
catching and spreading H1N1.
Where Do We Go from Here? 
Herd immunity teaches us that you cannot protect yourself 
from many communicable diseases without protecting your 
neighbor. The legal corollary is that individual employers and 
institutions will have problems if they deviate from the herd 
in instituting internal disease-control programs. Effective pro-
tection against seasonal flu, and thus against new agents such 
as avian flu or a more dangerous seasonal flu, really depends 
on a societal response.
The failure of public policy on the flu is a microcosm of a 
general problem in United States policy. Market ideology and 
the Reagan revolution have convinced a large part of the pub-
lic and many elected officials from the right and the left that it 
is acceptable to be a free rider, that is, to be greedy about soci-
etal resources. People want protection against a deadly pan-
demic but do not want to get their vaccinations, disrupt their 
work schedule, or pay taxes for the necessary infrastructure to 
make real protection possible. People on the Gulf Coast want 
to build and rebuild in areas that cannot be protected from 
hurricane destruction, and they expect subsidized flood insur-
ance and government handouts to pay them to do it. Governors 
who rail against federal taxes and federal intrusion into their 
states suddenly demand federal government protection from 
the very oil companies they have sold their states to.
Lawyers have had a major role in undermining vaccina-
tion policy. Massive public relations campaigns to discredit 
vaccines so as to increase the value of cases and arguing to 
There was never credible 
medical evidence that 
vaccines cause autism.
legislatures that disease-control laws are unconstitutional 
intrusions into individual rights are both considered well 
within ethical guidelines and might even be part of zealous 
advocacy. That does not change their pernicious effect on 
public policy. While we can hide behind our ethical codes, 
are we serving our clients’ interests or society’s? Does it 
really help the mother of a child with autism to have her fam-
ily wrapped up in a decades-long fight against vaccine manu-
facturers just because there is someone who will testify that 
all the science is wrong? Attacks by civil libertarian lawyers 
on disease-control measures aimed at gay bathhouses in the 
1970s and on HIV control measures in the 1980s succeeded 
only in condemning tens of thousands of gay men to a hor-
rible death.
Sometimes the herd matters, even to the individual. Our 
code of ethics is based on an adversary model, but public pol-
icy is not an adversary process, at least not in arenas such as 
public health where there is no effective advocate for proper 
policy. Law professors are as guilty of this as other lawyers. 
We confuse one-sided advocacy with scholarship to stake out 
the most outrageous positions on public policy issues, all too 
often for the sake of self-promotion. We cannot even claim to 
be defending a client’s interest. Outside the narrow confines 
of the courtroom, we all need to be better informed and more 
responsible for the consequences of our actions on the welfare 
of our community.   
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